

Ideology and Addison's Essays on the Pleasures of the Imagination



One of the dominant practices in contemporary eighteenth-century literary studies is reading art and aesthetics as ideology. This practice commonly issues in the specific claim that eighteenth-century literary writing and aesthetics serve the interests and values of the middle class or bourgeoisie, which is understood to be the rising or emerging group within a society whose economic structure can reasonably be referred to as “capitalism.” Indeed, as Lisa von Sneidern puts it in a recent article in *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, a journal that has encouraged and welcomed this approach, “it has become nearly commonplace to disclose how complicit the belles lettres were with the emergence of bourgeois capitalism and colonialism.”¹

Since Addison's essays on the pleasures of the imagination are, if not the origin of eighteenth-century English aesthetics as some have argued, then at least of central importance to English speculation about art during the period, it is not surprising to find that both they and the periodical in which they appeared are exhibits in the case for eighteenth-century aesthetics as bourgeois ideology.² In what, for those engaged in this project, was an extremely influential book published in 1962 but not translated into English until 1989, Jürgen Habermas identifies *The Spectator* as a major institution of “the bourgeois public sphere,” which he sees emerging in eighteenth-century western Europe. Following Habermas, Robert Holub discussed Addison's aesthetics and “its place in this atmosphere of bourgeois justification and preparation,” while Terry Eagleton discussed his literary criticism as part of “a project of a bourgeois cultural politics.” Carole Fabricant, unhappy with the way in which literary critics were ignoring social and political history, then tried to give some textual support to the argument by citing and commenting on Addison's essays on the pleasures in her essay, “The Aesthetics and Politics of Landscape in the Eighteenth Century.” Though Eagleton passes over Addison's aesthetics in his later major treatment of the subject, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Erin Mackie has recently reaffirmed, with some adjustments, Habermas' view of Addison's periodical as “an exemplary organ of the bourgeois public sphere” and proceeded to discuss Addison's aesthetics as a contribution to the “cultural aesthetic of bourgeois ideology.”³

That this case is untenable becomes clear, I propose, as soon as we begin to take into account some of the work that has been done by histo-

rians of eighteenth-century society and historians of post-Renaissance political thought since Habermas presented his vision of eighteenth-century English society and ideology thirty-eight years ago. By doing so, we can see not just that the understanding of Addison's aesthetics as bourgeois ideology is misguided, but also that the commitment to interdisciplinary studies that is supposedly a hallmark of the criticism supporting this understanding is weak. That the case is untenable is further evident once we consider those passages from Addison's essays that are cited as evidence, as well as some other passages from these essays. In response to the charge that denying the existence of bourgeois ideology in the essays is to empty them of all ideological content (on grounds that if Addison's ideology is not bourgeois it cannot be anything), I will further suggest that insofar as they serve, promote, or justify the interests of any social groups, Addison's essays serve the interests of the diverse groups that were represented by what these groups, their opponents, and historians call "Whigs." This becomes clear if, again, we take into account some of the work of historians of Augustan society and political thought ignored and misread by literary critics bent on making Addison (and other eighteenth-century figures) a bourgeois ideologue. This is not, however, to say that Whig ideology is the essence of these essays, or that these essays are reducible to what might be taken as a Whig political or social statement, or that those who fail to attend to this statement, whatever it may be, are naive and guilty of some kind of mystification themselves. On the contrary, as Addison himself claims in these essays, one of the proper functions of art and aesthetic theory is to give us the pleasures of perceiving something besides the hard and ugly truth. That Addison was in some ways promoting the interests of some groups and not others thus in no way renders illegitimate or unproductive our reading and teaching of him for pleasure, for insight into the nature of art, and for anything else we might happen to value besides knowledge about his politics.



After arguing that Addison's description of landscape in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination is governed by what Ronald Paulson calls "the Whig fiction," Fabricant proceeds to the bolder proposition that these essays are "what is in certain ways the aesthetic equivalent of Locke's political theory" (p. 69). This is Fabricant's way of claiming that Addisonian aesthetics is the ideology of not just capitalism but *monopoly* capitalism and the bourgeoisie, since Locke's economic and political theories, "which begin with essentially egalitarian or liberal-democratic assumptions about the natural individual right to property, each man's right to his own labor, and the existence of free and equal beings in the state of nature, end with a defense of monopoly capitalism and class division" (p. 69). The problem with this version of the aesthetics-as-bourgeois ideology thesis is the way in which it makes recourse to Locke. The understanding of Locke as

the bourgeois ideologue of the eighteenth century is sanctioned by not only Marx and Habermas, but also C. B. Macpherson in his 1962 book, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, which Fabricant cites to support her case.⁴ But in his major political writing, *Two Treatises of Government*, Locke does not, as Macpherson claims, undermine the traditional view that ownership of property involved social obligations, justify both unlimited acquisition and the class division of capitalist economy, and thereby provide a moral basis for capitalist society.

One hardly need cite Locke's text to make this point, since this work has already been done by several of the top Locke scholars over the last thirty years. Indeed, a considerable amount of the most important scholarship since Macpherson on Locke's political writings has been devoted to refuting him. In *The Political Thought of John Locke* (1969), for example, John Dunn engages comprehensively with Macpherson and, while recognizing some of his strengths, identifies a series of misunderstandings, mistakes, and simplifications in his argument that reveal him to be "in-ept." J. G. A. Pocock observes several methodological problems with the pursuit of "bourgeois ideology" in Locke before concluding that the assimilation of Locke within "a monolithic paradigm of liberalism, or bourgeois ideology, or possessive individualism" simply fails to recognize both the debate over the place of virtue in history which, according to Pocock, dominated eighteenth-century social criticism, and the relatively minor importance of Locke in that debate. In an important essay he published in 1980, one that later became part of his ground-breaking book, Richard Ashcraft argued that "the longstanding consensual agreement on Lockean political theory as bourgeois ideology has operated as a barrier to our understanding not only of Locke but also of the relationship between political theory and ideology," and that Macpherson's "application of 'possessive individualism' and a market society model of capitalism to Locke's political ideas...is inadequate and even seriously misleading." In the same year, James Tully published *A Discourse of Property*, which, just as comprehensively as Dunn's classic work, is devoted to refuting Macpherson. Though some criticism has been directed against them, and though these scholars differ on important matters among themselves, their painstaking commentary on Locke's political and epistemological writing makes an extremely powerful case against the understanding of Locke as someone who is providing a moral basis for unlimited acquisition and absolute rights in private property, and who in his political writing is working on the premise or assumption that individuals are the possessive individuals of a market society.⁵ Relying on Macpherson, recent eighteenth-century literary critics including Fabricant and Mackie simply ignore this fact, presumably because it poses a major obstacle to the way they want to talk about eighteenth-century aesthetics, society, and ideology. Of course, Addison might still be a bourgeois ideologue even though Locke was not, but not if, as Fabricant claims, Addison's aesthetics are the equivalent of Lockean political theory.

The work that has been done by historians of Augustan political thought

since Habermas and Macpherson poses further general problems for the project of reading Addisonian aesthetics as bourgeois ideology. This is especially clear if we take seriously the work of a historian of ideology who is so authoritative in eighteenth-century studies that even those against whom he argues attempt to cite him in their favor. In his work of the last twenty-five years, Pocock has argued not just that Locke and Addison are not presenting a justification for what could be called bourgeois values or a bourgeois way of life, but that no one in the eighteenth century is doing so. This is in part because neither Locke, nor Addison, nor anyone else, perceived a class composed of merchants and tradesmen who were committed to unlimited acquisition of material wealth and the exploitation of another class of people who were selling their labor for a wage. Since the Augustans did not perceive the emergence of such a class, they were neither attacking nor justifying it and its values. What the Augustans perceived was a group of people who held a new kind of property—property in the form of government promises to pay back money that was loaned to it, company promises to pay back money that was loaned to it, tokens of ownership in companies, money paid by the government for administrative or military service, and money paid by individuals to those people (stockjobbers) who bought and sold for themselves and others tokens of ownership in companies and their promises to pay back the money they borrowed. This new kind of property was commonly understood as making people dependent on others, especially government, for their welfare. It was enabled and supported by new institutions, such as the Bank of England, the National Debt, the professional standing army, and the Exchange where people could buy and sell these promises and stocks. The people who held this new kind of property were, according to Pocock, perceived as a distinct group of people, understood and referred to not as a middle class but as “the monied interest,” which was distinguished not from the aristocracy (since many aristocrats were part of the monied interest) but from the “landed interest,” and the issue was whether these people who held this new form of property and who were therefore dependent in particular ways on others would necessarily become corrupt and corrupt the government which depended upon them and upon which they depended. It is because, for Pocock, from the Glorious Revolution on through the entire eighteenth century, the central question in English political and social theory was whether a government that relied on money it borrowed from the public and a professional army corrupted the government and the people, that Pocock has had difficulty in finding any bourgeois ideology during the period. And it is because he sees this as the central question during the eighteenth century that the central *polemical* drive of his work has been directed against the view that the real story of eighteenth-century political discourse and thought is about the struggle between a fading aristocratic ethos and a rising bourgeois (Lockean) ideology. This refined but intense polemical dimension of his work, and many of its essential theses, are on display in the long essay on Whig ideology from *Virtue, Commerce, and History*:

Marxist and *marxisant* historians retain an apparently ineradicable allegiance to the idea of the rising bourgeoisie or middle class, without which, it seems—though one may want to ask why—not only their classical system but their entire way of thinking would disintegrate. They feel obliged to explain all social opposition or radical thought in preindustrial eighteenth-century Britain—unless it can be dismissed as ‘traditional’ or outright ‘reactionary’—as the ideology of a bourgeoisie, to be contrasted with that of an aristocracy that must be shown to have been feudal, paternalist, or hierarchical; this bourgeois radicalism must further be integrated with a ‘liberal’ possessive individualism associated as closely as possible with the name of Locke, who has become a necessary actor in their scheme of things. Historians of this persuasion have been offended by the suggestion that radicalism in the eighteenth century consisted largely of a polemic against a system of public credit dominated by a landed aristocracy, that it was conducted largely in the name of classical-republican and agrarian-military values, and that it was in the defense of the Whig aristocracy that an ethos of commercial individualism was first elaborated.⁶

Putting aside for the moment Pocock’s direct treatment of Addison, his account of the general conditions of Augustan social and political debate preclude not just Addison but all significant players in this debate from being the kind of ideologue postulated by many eighteenth-century literary critics. That is to say that for this important historian of political thought and discourse, the hypothesis of Addison as bourgeois ideologue fails in a fundamental sense to recognize the specific social and political conditions in which Addison was operating and therefore fails to describe his political thought. Pocock is, of course, not the last word on the issue, though he is for many the most significant word on it to date, and one would think that literary critics such as Eagleton, Fabricant, and Mackie who are so concerned with ideology might challenge him or point to his failings. But this is not the case. Fabricant and Eagleton ignore him, and Mackie, blithely overlooking the fact that Pocock’s work is directed against *marxisant* literary critics such as herself, manages to find and cite a few passages from Pocock to make it look as though he supports her (Mackie, pp. 39, 128–29, 138). Because these critics fail to come to terms with Pocock, their case for Addison the bourgeois ideologue remains open to the polemical drive of his work.

It is because some of these critics construe Addison’s ideology as one that serves a class which was in fact in place or “rising” within a market society that actually existed by the early eighteenth century—it is because their account of Addison presupposes a particular socioeconomic history—that their case is also vulnerable to criticism from the precincts of English socioeconomic history. That Fabricant understands Addison’s aesthetics as being ideological in the sense that it serves the interests of a middle class operating within a market society that actually existed is clear from her conception of Addison as a “well-to-do exponent of middle-class culture” (p. 55) who works to “reinforce and legitimize existing social and economic hierarchies” (p. 69). Though at times she emphasizes the “emer-

gence” of what she calls “the bourgeois social order” (p. xiii) and the “bourgeois public sphere,” Mackie, too, seems to understand Addison as a bourgeois ideologist in the sense that he writes in the service of an existent middle class that was both exploiting the labor for sale on the open market and wresting power from a waning and degenerate aristocracy. *The Spectator* is addressed to “people in those mid-level economic and social positions we now group under the rubric ‘the middle class’” and is a crucial agent “in the definition of the cultural ideals of that class” (p. 2). In looking at the essays of Addison and Steele, Mackie thus claims to be studying “the operations of power characteristic of the bourgeois public sphere” (p. 18). Advising that we see eighteenth-century society in the context of “the long transition from feudalism to capitalism” (p. 32), Mackie asserts that the commercialization of agriculture during the seventeenth century brought about foundational changes in English society which “by the Restoration...were largely complete” and resulted in “the possessive market society” in which labor is a market commodity and the Lockean doctrine of rights serves to protect absolute property rights (as described by Macpherson). In short, “the world that Mr. Spectator lives both in and out of is the world of the mode, which is also the world of the capitalized, commercial, and materialist West” (p. 37). As such, it is a world in which those like Addison and Steele, who assume the bourgeois point of view, “snatch the standards of cultural and social value away from a ‘degenerate’ aristocracy and plant them in their own ethically normative, bourgeois camp” (p. 81).

This general view of early eighteenth-century English society as one that is essentially modern, one in which a middle class, aware of itself as a class, is exploiting a workforce selling its labor for a wage on the open market, asserting an ethos of possessive individualism under the auspices of Locke’s political writings, and wrestling political, economic, and cultural power away from a waning aristocracy was powerfully challenged by social historians in the mid-1980s. In *Aristocratic Century* (1984), for example, John Cannon marshals a substantial amount of detailed information in the service of the view that post-1688 English society was a hierarchical one, the economic, political, and cultural life of which was *increasingly* dominated by the aristocracy over the course of the eighteenth century. The middling orders of this society did not seriously challenge aristocratic rule but acquiesced in it until the end of the century.⁷ And in *English Society, 1688–1832*, J. C. D. Clark made himself notorious by observing aspects of eighteenth-century life such as the lack of significant parliamentary reform until the Reform Bill; the irrelevance of Locke’s political writings to eighteenth-century political debate (in part because of his religious heterodoxy); the institution of service; the intellectual ascendancy of the ideal of the gentleman; the deference of mercantile and landed elites to an aristocratic ethos; the persistence of low-life aristocratic behavior such as duelling, clubbing, and gambling; the increasing wealth and political power of the aristocracy; the persistence of patriarchal theory (including divine right theory of government); and the reli-

gious grounds of all forms of political radicalism. From this he infers that eighteenth-century society was neither secular, nor bourgeois, nor democratic, nor modern, but Anglican, aristocratic, monarchical, and old—it was, in short, an “ancien regime.”⁸

Several more recent historians of the period reaffirm, with various qualifications, the general picture presented by Cannon and Clark. In her well-received book, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, for example, Linda Colley claims that wealth, status, and power over both the state and the lives and opinions of the people lied overwhelmingly with a ruling elite consisting of the gentry and the peerage. And while she acknowledges the growing numbers, wealth, and power of the middling orders engaging in trade and commerce, she emphasizes that rather than challenging the ruling elite, the middling orders entered into a relationship with it that benefited both parties. Moreover, in response to the critique of the ruling elite, especially the aristocracy, that emerged in the 1760s and 1770s and became part of mainstream political discourse and middle-class opinion in the 1780s, the ruling elite adopted an ethos of military heroism and public service that allowed it to consolidate its own social and political dominance. It follows that “the middle classes in this country did not succeed in storming the citadels of high political and economic power until the second half of the nineteenth century.”⁹

In his two recent books on the subject, Geoffrey Holmes also corroborates Cannon’s view of the period as an aristocratic century, and Clark’s vision of a society the cultural norms of which were set by the gentry and peerage and which trickled down to the middling orders. While Holmes observes the growing power and importance of the monied interest, and the animosity that the landed interest felt toward it during the opening decades of the century, he also emphasizes how by the 1730s the men of trade and finance were assimilated, along with the new professional groups, “into a social elite whose culture, values and mores all men of property, irrespective of function, came—as ‘gentlemen’—to share.”¹⁰ And in *Imagining the Middle Class*, Dror Wahrman claims that “it remains doubtful that recent research has shown the coherent presence of a middle class as a distinctive cultural or political agent during the early eighteenth century.” Wahrman moreover argues that the vision of a society grounded in a virtuous and increasingly powerful middle class, while occasionally arising during the eighteenth century, “did not really move people, mobilize or enrage them, or otherwise significantly resonate with their political convictions” prior to the 1790s. And when in the wake of the French Revolution this vision, or what Wahrman refers to as the “middle class idiom,” did emerge powerfully, it was driven not by a middle class that was demanding greater political power and that was understood to be inherently commercial or urban, but by various political agendas such as opposition to the wars against France, agendas held by members of diverse social groups, such as dissenters, merchants, shopkeepers, rural yeomen and gentry, urban tradesmen, and the Friends of Peace.¹¹

Finally, Frank O’Gorman presents his observations of the increasing

wealth and social and political influence of the middling orders as grounds not for rejecting but qualifying Clark's vision of Georgian society. For he reaffirms the view that political power during the century rested with a Whig aristocratic oligarchy that became increasingly wealthy and powerful during the period, in part because of the "harmony" and "collaboration" that existed between it and the commercial middling orders that "were not bearers of a new social ethic and...were not the agencies of a new vision of how society should be organized." On the contrary, the middling orders remained willing to accept "the continuing supremacy of a social and political system dominated by the aristocracy and gentry," mainly because this regime exercised its power through compromise and negotiation with the middling orders and was well disposed toward the finance, commerce, and industry in which their wealth and power were grounded.¹²

Certainly, Cannon and Clark have more severe critics. Peter Earle, for example, claims that between the Restoration and 1730, "the middle classes were creating a completely new culture for themselves, a bourgeois culture that was destined to become the dominant national culture." But even Earle has to observe that early eighteenth-century society did not consist of discrete self-contained groups that conceived of themselves as classes, but was a continuous hierarchy, and that the difference between the middling orders and the upper orders became increasingly confused during the period, in part because of the "impenetrable web of relationships" that existed between them. There are clearly further problems with understanding this middling order as the bourgeoisie since most of its capital was engaged in agriculture, commerce, and distribution and its members were "not the sort of capitalists that Marx had in mind when he analysed the bourgeoisie."¹³

Paul Langford takes issue more directly with the views of Cannon, Clark, and later historians in arguing that the understanding of Georgian England as an essentially aristocratic society overlooks the "overwhelming importance of bourgeois elements in the social history of the period." But he, too, makes important concessions to Cannon and Clark when he observes that what unified the middle orders more than anything were not commitments to a distinct middle-class culture and a deep-seated opposition to the gentry and peerage, but "their passion for aping the manners and morals of the gentry more strictly defined, as soon as they possessed the material means to do so." The "middle class revolution" Langford describes was thus one by "conjunction" rather than confrontation, and one which subtly reshaped the role of what Langford still refers to as "the governing class which was the object of imitation." Moreover, Langford observes that in the face of the anti-aristocratic rhetoric of the latter part of the century, the landed aristocracy did not lose its authority, but was forced to exercise it in ways that were responsive to "the moral values and political weight associated with the propertied class as a whole, especially its massive middle-class core."¹⁴ In a later book, Langford again emphasizes the way in which the nobility continued "to command respect and deference" and preserved its influence "by submitting itself to the require-

ments of a broad propertied society.” And he here frankly admits that his approach “underplays the aristocratic control and oligarchical influence which many have seen as typical of the age.”¹⁵ It is because Langford makes such concessions that other historians such as O’Gorman can reasonably cite his work as grounds not for rejecting the views of Cannon and Clark, but for qualifying them (O’Gorman, pp. 107 & 173). And even given these qualifications to Cannon and Clark, virtually no one is urging a return to the picture of the early eighteenth century painted by Christopher Hill and Macpherson against which Canon and Clark were arguing. Given both the unqualified and qualified versions of the Cannon/Clark view of eighteenth-century society which have been emerging in recent scholarship on this subject, the crude feudalism-to-capitalism socio-economic history postulated by critics such as Fabricant, Eagleton, and Mackie appears to be inadequate in fundamental respects. And if the socio-economic history of these critics is inadequate, then Addison cannot be a bourgeois ideologist of the particular kind these critics claim he is.



But what about the text itself? What is it that Addison says in his essays on the pleasures of the imagination that leads these critics to think that they amount to bourgeois ideology? Fabricant cites the following from the opening essay in the series: “A Man of a Polite Imagination, is let in a great many pleasures that the vulgar are not capable of receiving...he looks upon the World, as it were, in another Light, and discovers in it a Multitude of Charms, that conceal themselves from the generality of Mankind” (p. 68). Perhaps in distinguishing between the polite and the vulgar, Addison is in some way qualifying his explicitly and powerfully stated views throughout the essays that anyone, regardless of their economic status or educational training, can enjoy the pleasures of the imagination. But there is no indication here that it is only by virtue of social status, money, and education that one moves from being vulgar to being polite. Even if there was, nothing in this passage indicates that the educated polite are acquisitive individuals buying cheap labor on the market and not members of the gentry or landed Whig aristocracy. Addison concludes the passage by claiming that the polite man “can converse with a Picture, and find an agreeable Companion in a Statue. He meets with a secret Refreshment in a Description, and often feels a greater Satisfaction in the Prospect of Fields and Meadows, than another does in the Possession.”¹⁶ Could we not reasonably say that he is here asserting the pleasures of beholding over those of owning and, so, is in some sense dismissing the pleasures of getting and owning that are supposedly at the heart of the bourgeois way of life?

Fabricant proceeds to cite a passage in which she thinks the point is made in a literary context:

For, to have a true Relish, and form a right Judgment of a Description, a Man should be born with a good Imagination.... The Fancy must be warm, to retain the Print of those Images it hath received from outward Objects; and the Judgement discerning, to know what Expressions are most proper to cloath and adorn them to the best Advantage. A Man who is deficient in either of these Respects, tho' he may receive the general Notion of a Description, can never see distinctly all its particular Beauties: As a Person, with a weak Sight, may have the confused prospect of a Place that lies before him, without entering into its several Parts, or discerning the variety of its Colours in their full Glory and Perfection. (p. 70)

According to Fabricant, Addison is here affirming “a hierarchic Chain of Seeing” which “justifies social distinctions by converting them into epistemological, aesthetic, even biological categories” (p. 70). But Fabricant is simply begging the question here: she *assumes* that the difference between those who can enjoy and judge and those who cannot corresponds to or is grounded in a class difference, and then reads Addison’s account of this difference as a translation of this class difference. But in this passage, Addison gives no indication that differences in the ability to enjoy and judge art are grounded in or answerable to a class difference—he says merely that different men are born with different abilities to enjoy and judge art. But even if one could justify the claim that Addison in this passage is claiming that differences in aesthetic ability correspond to a class difference, why should we think that the specific class difference Addison is “converting” is that which is central to capitalist society, the difference between the bourgeoisie and the workers? If in this passage Addison is converting a class difference, he is converting a specific class difference which Fabricant assumes exists but which neither Addison nor many social historians of the period postulate.

When Addison claims that “a whole Estate [may] be thrown into a kind of Garden by frequent Plantations, that may turn as much to the Profit, as the Pleasure of the Owner,” and that “a Man might make a pretty Landskip of his own Possessions” (pp. 70–71), he is claiming that property in land can be made beautiful and, so, the source of pleasure. Fabricant makes the point by saying that Addison is here giving “his readers lessons in how the economically appropriated and the financially lucrative can be turned into—or be seen in terms of—the aesthetically satisfying” (p. 71). It is perhaps because it is so difficult to see how this can count as evidence for the view that Addison recognizes the emergence of a class that is selling its labor on an open market to capitalists, that he is in some way affirming and defending the values and activities of these capitalists, or even that, unknown to him, he is doing these things, that Fabricant simply leaves her commentary at that and does not even attempt to make her case.

Mackie’s claim that these essays are part of the “cultural aesthetic of bourgeois ideology” rests on little more than observations about *similarities* between some Augustan descriptions of shopping and descriptions of perceiving works of art in a few of Addison’s sentences. She begins by citing a number of different texts, one of which is the distressed shop-

keeper Rebecca's letter from *Spectator* #336 in which she complains about some of her customers:

I am in a fair way to be easy, were it not for a Club of Female Rakes, who, under Pretence of taking their innocent Rambles forsooth, and diverting the Spleen, seldom fail to plague me twice or thrice a Day, to cheapen Tea or buy a Screen, *what else should they mean?* as they often repeat it. These Rakes are your idle Ladies of Fashion, who having nothing to do, employ themselves in tumbling over my Ware. One of these No-Customers (for by the way they seldom or never buy any thing) calls for a Set of Tea Dishes, another for a Bason, a third for my best Green Tea, and even to the Punch-Bowl there's scarce a Piece in my Shop but must be displac'd, and the whole agreeable Architecture disorder'd, so that I can compare 'em to nothing but to the Night-Goblins that take a Pleasure to over-turn the Disposition of Plates and Dishes in the Kitchens of your housewifely Maids. Well, after all this Racket and Clutter, this is too dear, that is their Aversion, another thing is charming but not wanted: The Ladies are cur'd of the Spleen, but I am not a Shilling the better for it.... (3:245)

By referring to the shoppers as "Rakes," Mackie observes, Rebecca identifies them with "male aristocrats who misbehave in stylish ways." Complaining about these shoppers who engage in what Mackie understands to be "the old aristocratic style of arrogant and destructive conduct," Rebecca thus "participates in an ongoing campaign for bourgeois standards of conduct and consumption" (pp. 80–81). But these ladies are unusual aristocrats, for Rebecca's description of them also reveals, according to Mackie, that they "fetishize the commodity" and engage in "the imaginative consumption of the commodity" in order to cure their physiological problems (p. 82). Now, in the opening essay on the pleasures, Addison claims that "the Pleasures of the Fancy are more conducive to Health, than those of the Understanding.... Delightful Scenes, whether in Nature, Painting, or Poetry, have a kindly Influence on the Body as well as the Mind." In addition, he writes that this exercise of the imagination disperses "Grief and melancholly" and sets "the Animal Spirits in pleasing and agreeable Motions" (p. 83). Mackie observes that there are important similarities between shopping as this is described by Rebecca and observing works of art and nature as this is described in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination: "Speculative consumption," she writes, "depends on the exercise of the imaginative faculties and through them, has an effect on both body and spirit. Likewise the plan for the cultivation of aesthetic pleasures involves the imaginative appropriation of visually acquired objects; and like window-shopping and other forms of commodity fantasy, this aesthetic acquisition is a tonic for body and soul" (p. 83). It is in part from the fact of this similarity between the aristocratic, fetishistic shoppers in Rebecca's shop and Addison's imagination, that Mackie infers that Addison's essays are bourgeois ideology.

But there is nothing in Addison to indicate that the female "Rakes" and "Idle Ladies of Fashion" who tumble over the ware in Rebecca's shop

are engaged in “the imaginative consumption of the commodity” (p. 82). Indeed, the fact that they do not buy anything, that “this is too dear, that is their Aversion, another thing is charming but not wanted” (p. 81), might reasonably be taken as an indication that they can *not* imagine themselves owning and using the things they handle. And it is only on a vague definition of fetishization as something that “has to do with all the nonmaterial qualities and uses of the object” (p. 82) that Mackie can get any plausibility for her move from the fact that shopping can cure the vapors to the fact that these shoppers are fetishizing the commodity. More importantly, in understanding Rebecca’s complaint to be made in the name of bourgeois standards of conduct and consumption, Mackie presumes not just that Rebecca is Addison’s spokesman, but also that the commodity fetishization and the imaginative consumption of the commodity displayed by the ladies are features not of the bourgeois shopper but of the aristocrat. But why should we think that Rebecca represents Addison’s views? And is not commodity fetishization, according to Marx whom Mackie cites here, the malaise not of degenerate aristocrats, but of bourgeois shoppers? If so, Rebecca’s complaint would then really be against aristocratic shoppers who are in important ways bourgeois. But even if Mackie could somehow make good on the description of the shoppers as aristocrats who both violate standards of bourgeois conduct and consumption and suffer the essential malaise of the bourgeois shopper, and even if Addison’s imagination was “like” them, she would still have to do more work than she does to get to the claim that Addison’s aesthetics are bourgeois ideology. For the fact that the imagination as it is described by Addison is “like” fetishistic, aristocratic shoppers described by Rebecca does not necessarily mean that Addison is a bourgeois ideologue.

Though critics such as Fabricant and Mackie are attentive to resemblances, for some reason they shy away from the only passage in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination where Addison explicitly discusses the activity of promoting and selling goods for profit, an activity that would supposedly be justified, legitimized, or mystified and glossed over as the precondition for the middle-class way of life by its ideologues. In the essay on gardens, Addison, complaining of how the “British Gardeners...love to deviate from [Nature] as much as possible,” confesses,

I would rather look upon a Tree in all its Luxuriancy and Diffusion of Boughs and Branches, than when it is thus cut and trimmed into a Mathematical Figure; and cannot but fancy that an Orchard in Flower looks infinitely more delightful, than all the little Labyrinths of the most finished Parterre. But as our great Modellers of Gardens have their magazines of Plants to dispose of, it is very natural for them to tear up all the Beautiful Plantations of Fruit Trees, and contrive a Plan that may most turn to their own Profit, in taking off their Evergreens, and the like Moveable Plants, with which their Shops are plentifully stocked. (3:552–53)

It is difficult to see how one could take this passage to mean that Addison is defending or in some way glossing over the activities of those garden

shops that would eliminate the competition and sell as many plants as they can to make the greatest possible profit and accumulate capital; neither does he appear to be affirming the activity of shop-owners who promote a certain idea of gardens, a garden fashion, for the sake of making more money. On the contrary, he is here clearly criticizing these activities, even if they are “very natural” for shopkeepers. And he is being critical of them not on ecological grounds, nor on ethical grounds, but on aesthetic grounds, on grounds of imaginative pleasure. Addison criticizes people who sell things for profit and get people wanting and thinking things, who set fashions, so people will buy more, because they make the world ugly. And, for Addison, the problem with the ugly world is not that it is dirty or unjust but that it does not give us the particular kind of pleasure he values, seeks, and explicitly recommends in these essays. Because this passage is critical of those who pursue profit and who adopt certain strategies to do so on grounds of the particular kind of damage it does to the world, it poses a difficulty for the view that Addison’s aesthetics amount to some kind of defence of the kind of economy grounded in this type of activity and the class that engages in and thrives upon it.

When confronted with a passage such as this, Mackie would presumably do what she does when she deals with some of those other passages in the *Spectator* in which Addison explicitly criticizes what she takes to be bourgeois values. She would concede that Addison is presenting “an accommodating critique of the institutions and ideologies of capitalism” (p. 7); consolidating “other spheres of identification understood as competitive with” the bourgeois public sphere (p. 24); advancing reforms “against the threat of a society driven by the sometimes ruthless, sometimes senseless, unpredictable whims of a market economy beyond rational social management” (p. 28); channelling “passions for consumption into avenues mapped out on ethical and social coordinates, rather than on the valueless grid of profit and loss” (p. 29); isolating “certain of capital’s commercial and financial effects of the basis of the false values they produce” (p. 53); recognizing that the “problem with investing too greatly in consumption is that it implicates both men and women in sexual, social, and cultural networks that produce superficial relationships, debased lives, and vacant thoughts” (p. 66); criticizing “the conditions of cultural production in the early eighteenth century” (p. 217). But this kind of concession, which Mackie finds herself forced to make throughout her book, would, at least in her mind, in no way compromise her case for Addison’s aesthetics as bourgeois ideology. It would only be more evidence that Addison’s bourgeois ideology and the bourgeois public sphere in general are “paradoxical,” afflicted with “tensions,” “under construction,” and “dialectical” (pp. 10, 20, 24, 27, 145, 148, 153, 206, & 262). Instead of considering Addison’s pervasive and direct criticism of the kind of commercial activity on which the bourgeoisie, if it existed, would thrive, as evidence that it is simply mistaken to regard him as the grand instituteur of the bourgeois public sphere, that is, Mackie would insist, as she does throughout her book, that this sphere is so highly complicated that it can

accommodate virtually everything you throw at it. It is precisely at this moment when it comes to explain everything that the bourgeois public sphere explains nothing.



Not, at least, Addison's aesthetics. In light of Addison's direct criticism of selling for profit in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination and elsewhere, the passages from these essays these critics cite, the highly problematical assumptions and inferences they must make to state their case, and work that has been done since Habermas and Macpherson on early eighteenth-century society and political thought, it seems more reasonable to abandon the reading of Addison's aesthetics as bourgeois ideology. For those literary critics who think that the only possible ideological work for eighteenth-century aesthetics to do is to promote and mystify the rising bourgeoisie and capitalism at large, such a move would, of course, be one in the direction of naivety, if not irresponsibility and downright complicity with such mystification. But, as we have already seen, several scholars who have studied the social, political, and economic conditions in which Addison was working identify other projects of justification and defence to which discussions of art might contribute during the period, one of which they refer to as "Whig ideology." And this is the social and political project with which several of them have recently been urging us to align Addison's general project. Placing him in the general context of the debate over the relationship between the new kind of property, the autonomy and virtue of citizens, and the integrity of governments, Pocock argues that with Addison, "Whig ideology now took a decisive turn toward social, cultural, and commercial values." Addison is a "polite Whig" who, in defending the interests of the parliamentary aristocracy and the rentier classes, is arguing against neither the social order nor the aristocracy but against neo-Harringtonian critics of the new commercial regime, radical deists, Jacobites, and at least some elements of the rural gentry. In his work on how the language of politeness in Augustan England came to be an important element of its political discourse, Lawrence Klein has elaborated upon this general view by emphasizing that while affirming trade and commerce, Addison was acutely aware of the limits of a purely commercial ethos and therefore, rather than endorsing a possessive individualism that would be appropriate to what we think of as the middle class and that would challenge an aristocratic ethos, promoted an ethos of politeness that would serve members of both the landed and the monied interests. That is to say Klein understands Addison's promotion of politeness in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination and elsewhere as part of a Whig project intended to serve the interests of both the landed man and the commercial man (and those aristocrats who were both) whom Addison saw as being profoundly dependent upon each other under the

new economic conditions (though Klein also observes that the discourse of politeness was being used by others in the service of different political agendas). Nicholas Phillipson, too, identifies Addison's language of manners and politeness as part of an emergent eighteenth-century irenic political discourse primarily concerned with the intemperance of party polemic, the country gentry, the high church, Jacobites, and dissenters.¹⁷

The point is not that understanding the ideology of Addison's aesthetics as a transformation of an ideology that, as Ashcraft has shown, took shape in the context of a particular political movement during the 1660s and 1670s, clearly settles the issue of what kind of socioeconomic interests Addison was promoting in describing and recommending as he did the pleasures of the imagination. The point is that a substantial body of strong scholarship over the last twenty years in social history and the history of political thought presents good grounds for considering the social and political agenda of Addison's writing about the pleasures of the imagination as a form of the broad political agenda that, by Addison's time, was explicitly affirmed and recognized by him and his contemporaries as Whig ideology. And, as this body of scholarship also shows, Whig ideology is fundamentally different from what literary critics take to be bourgeois ideology. To abandon the understanding of Addison's aesthetics as bourgeois ideology is thus not to give ourselves up to a depoliticized and profoundly naive criticism; on the contrary, it is a step toward recognizing the real political context and meanings of these essays.

But regardless of how one understands the political meanings of Addison's essays on the pleasures of the imagination, it is not the case, as many critics now seem to think, that these meanings constitute *the* meaning of these essays, that they are their essential meaning, or that all other meanings in some way reduce to these meanings.¹⁸ This would be the case if it were the case that whenever a work of aesthetics has some political meaning, or whenever an author writing about art intentionally or unintentionally defends or justifies a social group and its practices against others, this political meaning is the only or essential meaning, this is the only or essential thing that author is doing, or this meaning and action are those to which all that author's meanings and acts are reducible. But why should we think this? It is possible that, in writing about art, a person might be doing many things besides defending the interests of a social group, such as intentionally or unintentionally presenting a critique of the general concepts governing our perception and understanding of art; intentionally or unintentionally describing how his and others' erotic energies are implicated in their perception of art; intentionally or unintentionally revising earlier accounts of art; intentionally presenting an account of the nature of art and how we respond to it. And, if a person was doing some of these other things, it is hardly self-evident that they are all superficial, surface actions that are in some sense reducible to the deep, real, essential action that is social, material, and political. Thus, the fact that Addison, in writing about art, is intentionally or unintentionally saying something that would defend or justify particular social groups does

not mean that this is the only thing he is doing, or that it is the most important or essential thing he is doing, or that all the others things he may have been doing are reducible to this act. The political meanings of the essays on the pleasures of the imagination, whether they be Whig or bourgeois, do not constitute *the* meaning of these essays to which all who want to know their essence and truth must attend. They are simply one meaning of the essays, which, depending upon our situation, we may find worthwhile investigating, recognizing, and knowing about.

But even if the sociopolitical meaning of the essays are their *real* meaning, their essential truth, we still may, as Addison himself points out, have some good reasons for *not* always attending to it, for being grateful that we do not perceive it, and for being grateful that we are free from those who, demanding that we do, scold us when we do not. And these reasons have to do with pleasure. Commenting on Locke's account of primary qualities that actually exist in objects and secondary qualities that do not, Addison writes,

Things would make but a poor Appearance to the Eye, if we saw them only in their proper Figures and Motions: And what Reason can we assign for their exciting in us many of those Ideas which are different from any thing that exists in the Objects themselves, (for such are Light and Colours) were it not to add Supernumerary Ornaments to the Universe, and make it more agreeable to the Imagination? We are every where entertained with pleasing Shows and Apparitions, we discover imaginary Glories in the Heavens, and in the Earth, and see some of this Visionary Beauty poured out upon the whole Creation; but what a rough unsightly Sketch of Nature should we be entertained with, did all her Colouring disappear, and the several Distinctions of Light and Shade vanish? In short, our Souls are at present delightfully lost and bewildered in a pleasing Delusion, and we walk about like the Enchanted Hero of a Romance, who sees beautiful Castles, Woods and Meadows; and at the same time hears the warbling of Birds, and the purling of Streams; but upon the finishing of some secret Spell, the fantastick Scene breaks up, and the disconsolate Knight finds himself on a barren Heath, or in a solitary Desert. (3:546–47)


Later, in the essay on the disagreeable, Addison again affirms our perception of misleading appearances on grounds that “the Mind of Man requires something more perfect in Matter, than what it finds there, and can never meet with any Sight in Nature which sufficiently answers its highest Ideas of Pleasantness” (3:569). It is because reality does not suffice, because the imagination is always “sensible of some Defect in what it has seen,” that Addison here affirms both the poet who provides representations of nature which are not true to it and the reader who, for that very reason, delights in them: “it is the part of a Poet to humour the Imagination in its own Notions, by mending and perfecting Nature where he describes a Reality, and by adding greater Beauties than are put together in Nature, where he describes a Fiction” (3:569). After giving several examples of how the poet may misdescribe reality, Addison concludes by

asserting that, “in a word, he [the poet] has the modelling of Nature in his own Hands, and may give her what Charms he pleases, provided he does not reform her too much, and run into Absurdities, by endeavouring to excell” (3:570). In the following essay, Addison discusses that kind of writing that describes “Fairies, Witches, Magicians, Demons, and departed Spirits,” and which appeals to “our natural Prejudices” (3:570). He claims that, “many are prepossessed with such false Opinions, as dispose them to believe these particular Delusions; at least, we have all heard so many pleasing Relations in favour of them, that we do not care for seeing through the Falshood, and willingly give our selves up to so agreeable an Impos-ture” (3:571–72). Though this kind of writing, at which the English excel, “owes its Original to the Darkness and Superstition of later Ages, when pious Frauds were made use of to amuse mankind, and frighten them into a Sense of their Duty,” Addison clearly likes it, and he is nostalgic when thinking of his “Forefathers” who “looked upon Nature with more Reverence and Horror, before the world was enlightened by Learning and Philosophy, and loved to astonish themselves with the Apprehensions of Witchcraft, Prodigies, Charms and Enchantments” (3:571–72).

Elsewhere in the essays, Addison very clearly distinguishes himself from philosophers such as Locke who are critical of art on epistemological grounds by arguing that the pursuit of the pleasures of the imagination is consistent with the pursuit of truth and proper religious belief and practice. In these passages, however, Addison makes clear that because he values the pleasures of the imagination so highly, he is, at least on some occasions, quite happy to give up the pursuit of knowledge and true religion in order to experience them. In response to the demand that we attend only to accurate representations of the material world, that we hold only true beliefs about God, and that we read only true, literal descriptions of the world which do not arouse our passions, Addison affirms the experience of perceiving qualities of things, such as light and color, which are not really in them, of being held by superstition, and of being entertained and moved by poetry and fairy writing. Rather than, as Mackie claims, advancing “modern standards of middle-class culture” by championing “the polite and aestheticized imagination against the illusions of fancy and enthusiasm” (p. 3), Addison has some attachments to the old illusions and enthusiasm and recommends what, in relation to what for him is reality, are illusory representations and delusory perceptions. He does so because these representations and perceptions give us a particular kind of pleasure which he values in and of itself, and because, as he says in the opening essay, this particular kind of pleasure is also good for our health and keeps us out of trouble. In recommending specific kinds of illusion and delusion on grounds of pleasure, health, and morality, Addison is thus directly challenging all those who demand that we see what is real and that we avoid, demystify, and defend ourselves against misleading representations and appearances, even if they do give us pleasure.

In Addison’s time, these were men of cold fancies and philosophical

dispositions such as Locke who condemned fairy writing and superstition, and who had little time for art in general;¹⁹ in our time, they are critics such as Fabricant, Eagleton, and Mackie who demand that we see the reality that is hidden and legitimized by Addison's essays, where reality is not God and the world of primary qualities, but the godless world of capitalism, commodity fetishism, and oppression of all kinds. Whatever its affiliations with the contemporary ideological critique of the Enlightenment, contemporary ideological criticism is thus in fact deeply allied with Enlightenment philosophy, at least as Addison understands it. For both claim to know what is real and both demand on moral and political grounds that we perceive it, that we make others perceive it, and that we avoid all those things, including states of passion and pleasure, that prevent us from doing so. Addison is beyond enlightenments, old and new, for he knows that *one* value art and speculations about it may have for us lies in their ability to deliver us from the real and their ability to provide and enhance the pleasures and passions which we sometimes experience when, beholding art and nature, we are deluded. He knows that things that make us feel "like the Enchanted Hero of a romance, who sees beautiful Castles, Woods and Meadows; and at the same time hears the warbling of Birds, and the purling of Streams," may be valuable, even though, or even precisely because, we are in fact "on a barren Heath, or in a solitary Desert." So that even if the real or essential meaning of the essays on the pleasures of the imagination is in some sense political, we may still quite reasonably proceed to ignore it, attending to more superficial meanings in the pursuit of those delights and passions for which more serious critics apparently have no need.

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NOTES

1. "Joined at the Hip: A Monster, Colonialism, and the Scriblerian Project," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 30 (1997): 225.

2. For the view that the essays on the pleasures of the imagination mark the origin of English aesthetics, see Samuel Monk, *The Sublime* (N.Y.: MLA, 1935), p. 57; Ernest Tuveson, *The Imagination as a Means of Grace* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1960), pp. 92 & 111; Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness,'" *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 20 (1961): 143; Peter Kivy, "Recent Scholarship and the British Tradition: A Logic of Taste—The First Fifty Years," in *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology*, ed. George Dickie & R. J. Sclafani (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1977), p. 627; Robert Holub, "The Rise of Aesthetics in the Eighteenth Century," *Comparative Literature Studies* 15 (1978): 271–83; William Youngren, "Addison and the Birth of Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics," *Modern Philology* 79 (1982):

282–83. Ronald Paulson makes his claim in *The Beautiful, Novel, and Strange: Aesthetics and Heterodoxy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 1996), p. 1.

3. See Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (1962), trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT, 1989); Holub, p. 278; Eagleton, *The Function of Criticism* (Thetford: Thetford Press, 1984); Fabricant, “The Aesthetics and Politics of Landscape in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Studies in Eighteenth-Century British Art and Aesthetics*, ed. Ralph Cohen (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1985), pp. 49–81; and Mackie, *Market à la Mode: Fashion, Commodity, and Gender in “The Tatler” and “The Spectator”* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997), pp. xiii & xv. Though he claims to be concerned with understanding the “formal preconditions” of “bourgeois subject formation” and cites Habermas with approval, Scott Black also appears to want to distance himself from the bourgeois ideology thesis by calling the public sphere “modern” rather than “bourgeois” and by claiming, finally, that *The Spectator* at large is “commercial but not capitalist” (“Social and Literary Form in the *Spectator*,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 33 [1999]: 21–42).

4. See selections from Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1990), pp. 185–89; Habermas, *Structural Transformation*, pp. 53–56; 91–98; and C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1962), pp. 194–262.

5. See Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1969); Pocock, “The Myth of John Locke and the Obsession with Liberalism,” in *John Locke* (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1980), pp. 1–24; and Richard Ashcraft, “The *Two Treatises* and the Exclusion Crisis: The Problem of Lockean Political Theory as Bourgeois Ideology,” in *John Locke*, pp. 25–114. See also David Miller, “The Macpherson Version,” *Political Studies* 30, no. 1 (1982): 120–27; and Richard Ashcraft, “Lockean Ideas, Poverty, and the Development of Liberal Political Theory,” in *Early Modern Conceptions of Property*, ed. John Brewer & Susan Staves (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 43–61. For a recent, charitable, and comprehensive summary of the case against Macpherson, see James Tully, “After the Macpherson Thesis,” in his *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1993), pp. 71–95.

6. Pocock, “The Varieties of Whiggism,” in *Virtue, Commerce, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1985), p. 242. For more of this polemic, see “Early Modern Capitalism,” in *Feudalism, Capitalism, and Beyond*, ed. E. Kamenka & R. S. Neale (Canberra: ANU, 1975), pp. 62–83; *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1975), chaps. 11–14; “Authority and Property: The Question of Liberal Origins,” in *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, pp. 51–71; and Pocock’s review of Isaac Kramnick’s *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America*, in *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 25 (1992): 219–27.

7. *Aristocratic Century: The Peerage of Eighteenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1984).

8. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1985).

9. (New Haven: Yale Univ., 1992), p. 193.

10. See Holmes, *The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain, 1660–1722* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 291, and *The Age of Oligarchy: Pre-Industrial Britain, 1722–1783* (New York: Longman, 1993), p. 36.

11. *Imagining the Middle Class: The Political Representation of Class in Britain, c. 1780–1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1995), pp. 4, 46, 54–73.

12. See O’Gorman, *The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History, 1688–1832* (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. xiii, 106, 108–09.

13. Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class* (London: Methuen, 1989), pp. 3–8, 331.

14. *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 61, 67, 79, 692.

15. *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689–1798* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), pp. 540, 552, vi.

16. *The Spectator*, ed. Donald Bond, 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1965), 3:538.

17. See Pocock, “Varieties of Whiggism,” pp. 234–39; Lawrence E. Klein, “The Politi-

cal Significance of 'Politeness' in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain," in *Politics, Politeness, and Patriotism*, ed. Gordon Schochet (Washington, D.C.: Folger Inst., 1993), pp. 73–108; "Property and Politeness in the Early Eighteenth-century Whig Moralists: The Case of the *Spectator*," in *Early Modern Conceptions of Property*, ed. John Brewer & Susan Staves (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 221–33; "Politeness for Plebes: Consumption and Social Identity in Early Eighteenth-century England," in *The Consumption of Culture: 1600–1800: Image, Object, Text*, ed. Ann Bermingham & John Brewer (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 362–82; and Nicholas Phillipson, "Politeness and Politics in the Reigns of Anne and the Early Hanoverians," in *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800*, ed. J. G. A. Pocock with the assistance of Gordon J. Schochet & Lois Schwoerer (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1993), pp. 211–45.

18. For further testimony to this consensus, and several different arguments against it, see *Aesthetics and Ideology*, ed. George Levine (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ., 1994).

19. In "Addison's Mastery of Locke," I argue that this is one of several reasons for objecting to the standard view that Addison simply adopts and popularizes Lockean epistemology in these essays (*1650–1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era*, forthcoming).

